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SUMMARY
Summary
This thesis presents a quite extensive literature review on literature concern-
ing entrepreneurship, allocation of talent and rent-seeking. There is also a
presentation of two models, one model concerning the allocation of talent and
rent seeking. The second, demonstrates how rent-seeking affects investments
in an economy.
In the empirical part of the thesis there is a re-estimation of the results
found in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, The Allocation of Talent: Implications
for Growth (1991). The result found in this study is only partially recreated
here; most of the re-estimations fail to show significance at conventional
levels.
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PREFACE
Preface
In the process of writing this thesis, I have gained a deeper understanding
of economics as a field and also gained enormous respect for the men and
women that conduct economic research. In the process of writing this thesis
I also feel that I have gained an understanding of how “vesle Jensemann” in
the song “Julepresangen” by Alf Prøysen must have felt. In this song there
is a young boy who wants to make a Christmas present for his mother at
woodwork. He starts out with big plans for what he wants to do, things that
are way too complicated for him. He therefore has to adjust his expectations
of what he is able to make for his mother, and ends up making a bread board.
I feel the story of writing my master thesis has some parallels to this
song, when I started writing I wanted to do everything. I wanted to make a
perfect economic model of the world and then test it empirically. As I have
come to learn – and I should have known – this is quite close to impossible
for a Masters student. Like Jensemann I had to adjust my expectations for
what I was able to produce. But in the end I think the result has turned out
okay, and this is to a great extent do to my two supervisors Tone Ognedal
and Fredrik Willumsen. I’m very pleased with how you two have guided me
through the work with this thesis, a big thanks to both of you. I also want to
thank Asmund Rygh, Carl Henrk Knutsen and Peter A. F. Brown for good
discussions and helpful comments.
Last but not least, I want to thank my family and my girlfriend Katerina
for supporting me and creating a good work environment at home.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
According to standard microeconomic theory; all agents in an economy want
to maximise their own utility – this also applies to an agent that act as
an entrepreneur. Like all other economic activities, entrepreneurial activity
creates both private and public rents. It is argued that the public rent is
much higher than the private, especially when it comes to wealth creating
entrepreneurship, Nordhaus (2004) has calculated that as little as 2.2 per
cent of the total surplus form innovations is captured by the inventor.
For individuals, there are two ways to obtain wealth, they could try to
increase total wealth, or they can try to obtain a larger share of total wealth.
Entrepreneurship and innovation are needed for both types, but only activ-
ities that increase total wealth is preferable from the point of view of the
society.1 These two different strategies for becoming rich can be denoted re-
distributive2 and productive wealth-seeking. Entrepreneurs can act as purely
rent-seeking entrepreneurs, when they do so they find hiccups and inconsis-
tencies in the economic system, and use these inconsistencies to enhance their
own situation.
In this thesis I seek to answer the question; how do rent-seeking and
wealth creating entrepreneurship affect the economy. I offer both theoretical
and empirical answers to this question in section 4 and 5 respectively.
There are numerous examples of novel rent-seeking, I will argue that
finding new ways of conducting rent-seeking is a type of entrepreneurship.3
1This is not entirely true redistributive wealth-seeking can enhance one nation above
another, for example when England granted patent to John Kemp a Flemish weaver in
1331 (North and Thomas, 1973, 147).
2This has been a common way of acquiring wealth throughout history for mankind;
“One famous example is Jericho, where already before 9000 bc there was a village on the
site of a never-failing spring. A thousand years later it had grown in size until its mud-
brick houses covered eight or nine acres and had big walls round them. The inhabitants
clearly felt they had something to protect and possible enemies to protect it from. They
owned wealth, and human beings had already discovered that one quick way to acquire it
was to take it from those who had it already.” (Roberts, 1993, 26).
3This idea was first developed by Murphy et al. (1991) and Baumol (1990, 2010).
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Specifically, I will discuss two ways this can have an effect on economic
growth. It can affect the economy through allocation of talent (Murphy
et al., 1991), and it can have an effect through lowering the investment rate
(Acemoglu, 1995). The common factor for all the above-mentioned studies is
that it’s the institutions in the economy that determines the amount of rent-
seeking. In both models it is the compensation contract that’s the source of
the misallocation of talent, talent flows into the sector which offer the most
attractive compensation contract.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that talented people gravitate toward sec-
tors with high compensations to talent. For example, as Roubini and Mihm
(2010, p. 191) notes: “[A]mong Harvard seniors surveyed in 2007, a whop-
ping 58 percent of men joining the workforce where bound for jobs in finances
or consulting. In a curious paradox, the United States now has too many
financial engineers and not enough mechanical or computer engineers . . . the
last time the United States saw comparable growth in the financial sector
was in the years leading up to . . . 1929.”4
Murphy et al. (1991) have tried to identify the compensation contract
by using the percentage of students enrolled in undergraduate law- and en-
gineering degrees. They have tested this idea in conjunction with economic
growth; and find a statistically significant relationship in some of their re-
gressions. I have tried to recreate these estimations with updated data, I
have not succeeded in reproducing their results.
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows; section 2 introduces a clas-
sification and discussion of different types of entrepreneur. Section 3 gives a
literature review of entrepreneurship in economic literature and rent-seeking,
section 4 presents the theories and models of rent-seeking entrepreneurs.
Section 5 tries to empirically test the relationship between rent-seeking en-
trepreneurs and economic growth, section 6 concludes the theses.
4For Princeton University graduates the number was 45 per cent Frank (2011, p. 162).
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2 Entrepreneurs
First we need a definition of an entrepreneur; translated literally, “entrepreneur
means one who undertakes – one of life’s doers” the Economist (2006). The
definition I will use is; “[A]ny entity, new or existing, that provide a new
product or service or that develops and uses new methods to produce or de-
velop existing goods and services at lower cost.” (Baumol et al., 2007, p. 3).
According to Kizner (2011), entrepreneurs are often seen as someone who
operates when the economy is in disequilibria, but it’s not clear if it’s the
entrepreneur who creates the disequilibrium or if the entrepreneurs guides
the economy back to equilibrium. Kizner (1979) theory of the entrepreneur
suggests that the entrepreneur recognise that there is a profitable arbitrage
opportunity in any disequilibrium and by taking advantage of this situation
helps bring the economy back to equilibrium. Schumpeter’s (1981/1934) in-
sight is that the entrepreneur’s occupation is to search for profitable oppor-
tunities to upset any equilibrium, which is what innovation is in its broadest
sense.5
In this thesis I will operate with two types of entrepreneurs, the wealth
5An often cited list of acts that are seen as entrepreneurial is Schumpeter (1981/1934,
p. 66):
1. The introduction of a new good – that is one with which consumers are not familiar
– or of a new quality of good.
2. The introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by
experienced in the branch of manufacturing concerned.
3. The opening of a new market, that is, it a market into which the particular branch
government during all the country in question has not previously entered, whether
or not this market has existed before.
4. The conquest of a new source of supply of raw material or half-manufactured goods,
again irrespective of whether the source already exist or whether it has first to be
created.
5. The carrying out of the new organisation in the industry, like the creation of a
monopoly position (for example through trustification) or the breaking up of a
monopoly position.
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creating and the rent-seeking entrepreneur. The wealth creating entrepreneurs
can be split into two subcategories, the innovating entrepreneur and the
replicative entrepreneur. The replicative entrepreneur is someone who organ-
ises a new business firm of any variety, whether or not a number of similar
firms already exist. This is the most common type of entrepreneur. The
other type of wealth creating entrepreneur – the innovative entrepreneur –
has the job of discovering new ideas and to put them into action. For the in-
novative entrepreneurs today’s practice is never good enough they are always
on the lookout for a more efficient way to conduct their business. According
to (Baumol, 2010, p. 18) “it is only the innovative entrepreneur who can be
associated firmly with the revolutionary growth of the economy”. It becomes
a question of definition, if the only thing that the replicative entrepreneur
does is to make identical copies of already existing firms. Then the state-
ment is probably true. But if creating local adjustments to the new business
is under the domain of the replicative entrepreneur, the statement can’t be
true.6
The easiest way to distinguish between innovating and the replicative
entrepreneur is to think of the former as the agent that shifts the produc-
tion possibility frontier upward, while the latter pushes the economy upward
toward the current frontier.7 This deviation lends itself nicely to economic
models, if one thinks of the endogenous growth model, where the replicative
6Gerschenkron (1962) uses Germany’s attempt to catch up with Britain – the country
with the most advanced technology at the time – in the 19th century as an example to
illustrate the problem of just copying other countries production units. He argues that
the technology Britain exported wasn’t fit for Germany since Britain’s technology was
more mature than what was appropriate for the German society of that time. So for
coping with this Germany had to develop new institutional instrument for overcoming
these obstacles. If one sees this kind of catch-ups as something done by the replicative
entrepreneur, Baumol’s statement can’t be true. These kinds of catch-ups are also associ-
ated with revolutionary growth of the economy. Acemoglu et al. (2006) have constructed
a growth model where a country’s “distance to the frontier” determines the selection of
suitable growth strategies.
7This way of thinking of the two types of entrepreneurs is credited to Professor Magnus
Henrekson at the Stockholm School of Economics (Baumol, 2010, p. 199, note 9).
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entrepreneur is the economic agent that is responsible for the problem that
it is impossible to earn money in equilibrium, if not the inventor (innovative
entrepreneur) is granted a temporary monopoly through the patent system.
The second main type of entrepreneur that I operate with in this thesis
is the rent-seeking entrepreneur. I define the rent-seeking entrepreneur as
someone that discovers a hitherto unknown technique of conducting rent-
seeking and puts this technique in to action. Since there isn’t any require-
ment that the new way of conducting business should add to the society’s
productivity, there is a possibility that a new business model is developed
to capture rents instead of creating them. This leads to the possibility of
rent-seeking entrepreneurs; obviously all types of entrepreneurs are some-
where between being completely rent-seeking or rent-creating entrepreneurs.
Someone who comes quite close to being a pure rent-seeking entrepreneur
is the entrepreneurs from Somalia. These entrepreneurs has discovered and
pioneered new methods for pirateering.
The phenomenon of rent-seeking entrepreneurs ranges from discovering
ways to capture society’s institutions with an unknown method e.g., new
methods for tax evasion, new financial instruments or outright bribing gov-
ernment officials. Most rent-seeking entrepreneurs are not criminals; a big
part of what constitutes the group rent-seeking entrepreneurs operates within
the boundaries of the law. Historically this group has often been consti-
tuted by people from professions like; bureaucrats, military personnel and the
clergy. These professions are seen as occupations that offers opportunity for
rent-seeking entrepreneurs (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Fukuyama,
2011, esp. chapter 23). Factors favouring rent-seeking entrepreneurs and
wealth creating entrepreneurs can be found in table 1.
The case of rent-seeking entrepreneurs can be seen as originating from
how political or economic institutions are structured, or as a result of cul-
ture and individual moral. Since entrepreneurs are an integral part of eco-
nomic growth, the determinants of whether or not an entrepreneur conducts
5
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Table 1: Factors favouring rent-seeking entrepreneurs and wealth creating
entrepreneurs
Factors making rent-seeking
an attractive choice
Factors making en-
trepreneurship an attractive
choice
Market
size
Large resources go to “of-
ficial” rent-seeking sectors,
such as the government,
army, or religion. Poorly
defined property rights
make wealth accessible to
“unofficial” rent-seekers.
Large wealth is up for
grabs, especially relative to
smaller goods markets.
Large market for goods.
Good communication and
transportation that facili-
tate trade.
Firm size Substantial authority and
discretion of rent-seekers
(such as government offi-
cials, army, etc.) enable
them to collect large sums
unhindered by law or cus-
tom.
Easy entry and expansion,
few diminishing returns in
operations, access to capital
markets.
Contracts Ability to keep a large por-
tion of collected rents. In
firms, observability of out-
put that yields appropriate
rewards.
Clear property rights,
patent protection. No
expropriation of rents
by rent-seekers. Ability
to start firms to collect
quasi-rents on talent.
Source: Murphy et al. (1991)
rent-seeking or wealth creating entrepreneurship is determined by the same
fundamental causes as economic growth. Acemoglu (2009, chapter 4) gives
four candidates for these fundamental causes, these four are: luck, geogra-
phy, culture and institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 39) uses
the difference between the two entrepreneurs Carlos Slim and Bill Gates to
6
2 ENTREPRENEURS
illustrate how different institutions give different entrepreneurs.8 Mr Slim
became rich through political contacts, while Mr Gates become wealthy by
starting and developing one of the world’s biggest software companies.
As noted by Baumol (2010), the entrepreneur has never found his proper
place in economic theory. There are several reasons for this; the most impor-
tant is probably that most economic models are concerned with economies
that are in equilibrium. So when the entrepreneur is mentioned, economists
from the classical era are regularly brought up in the discussion. But it isn’t
the superstars of classical economics – like Smith and Ricardo – that are
mentioned, it is Cantillon (1755) that first introduced the entrepreneur. And
later Say (1841, 1852) provided the first comprehensive discussion of the en-
trepreneur in economic analysis, emphasising the effect of the entrepreneur’s
reputation, judgement, and risk bearing on profit. Frank Knight’s (1921)
Ph.D. dissertation Risk, Uncertainty and Profit addresses the supply and
demand of entrepreneurship in the economy. There exist some attempts
at bridging the gap between mainstream microeconomic theory and en-
trepreneurship in the literature. Most notably among this works are Baumol
(2010), who attempts to bring the entrepreneurs and innovation into the
theory of value. As he writes: “My belief . . . is that I provide here the first
quasi-formal, theoretical analysis of the role and activities of the innovative
entrepreneur – an entre´e into the elementary theory of value.”9
8At the time of writing this two are number one and two on Forbes list of the most
wealthy individuals in the World.
9Italics in original.
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3 Literature Review
There are some works that linked the allocation of talent with rent-seeking
and entrepreneurs, most notable among these works are Baumol (1990), Mur-
phy et al. (1991) and Acemoglu (1995). The work by Baumol has a non-
technical character and makes use of historical case studies that underpins
his argument. Baumol’s argument is that the amount of entrepreneurs in the
society can be seen as constant, but what kind of activity they should choose
to deploy their talent in is determined by the compensation contracts. This
is also the main point in the work by Murphy et al. (1991) and Acemoglu
(1995), but these works are underpinned by a mathematical model. I will
have a more thoroughgoing presentation of these works below.
Works that are not directly related to the allocation of talent but has
interesting implications and are further developed by other authors such as
Mohtadi and Roe (2003), is the endogenous growth literature that started
with Romer (1990)10 and further developed by for example Aghion and Howit
(1992, 1998, 2009). Aghion and Howit emphasised creative destruction as an
important part of economic growth.11 Creative destruction is a result of
wealth creating entrepreneurs that compete at bringing the most efficient
production techniques to the market. This mechanism is also an important
motivating force for rent-seeking entrepreneurs; incumbents in a market have
strong incentives to hinder this kind of creative destruction. Since this threat-
ens their wealth, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that if societies don’t
have strong enough – or what they call inclusive – institutions this kind of
rent-seeking can completely destroy societies. They argue that this is what
happened to the Roman Empire, Venice and several other societies that once
where wealthy but are not anymore.
Mohtadi and Roe (2003) has developed a two sector endogenous growth
10This is not entirely correct, there exists some earlier works. For a well written and
interesting read of the development and history of this line of thought see Warsh (2006).
11Grossman and Helpman (1991) is another early contribution to this literature.
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model that shows that both very young and mature democracies grow faster
than countries in the middle stages of democratization. They find that in
autocracies the asymmetric distribution of power and privilege tends to iso-
late policymakers from public responsibility, rewarding rent-seeking activ-
ities and thus attracts talented individuals away from wealth creating en-
trepreneurship. While in democracies it is easier to influence public choice
which makes rent-seeking more attractive, but at the same time there are
more rent-seekers, this reduce the rent that is possible to obtain through
rent-seeking. Furthermore, legal and institutional reforms in response to de-
mands for redistribution lead to greater sanctions and rent-seeking activities.
Corcho´n (2008) presents a model of the allocation of talent in conjunction
with governance, more specifically, he models how this allocation is influenced
by autocracy and parliament rule. His model suggest that under autocracy
rent-seeking reflects the taste of the autocrat for such activities, while under
parliament rule rent-seekers depends on parliament voting. This study shows
that under parliament rule the size of rent-seeking may be larger than it is
under autocracy. The main conclusion of the paper is that the existence of a
parliament is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the decline of
rent-seeking. And he argues that this can be seen as casting doubt on the idea
that “right” institutions necessarily promote good economic performance.
Works in economic history also deals with this kind of problems see es-
pecially the anthology by (Landes, Mokyr, and Baumol, 2010). Several of
these works discuss rent-seeking entrepreneurs, and points to different moti-
vations for why the entrepreneur chooses to deploy his talent in rent-seeking
activities instead of rent creating ones. Motivations that are often mentioned
are; institutions, relative prices, and the reputation of the entrepreneur. All
of these elements are important, but the reputation explanation is weak.
The logic in this argument is; for some unknown reason entrepreneurs be-
come popular and this leads to more entrepreneurs which results in higher
economic growth. This can very well be the case, but there could be an al-
9
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ternative explanation to why favourable reputation for the entrepreneur and
wealth creating activities often coincide. It could be the case that the reward
system has become more favourable toward wealth creating entrepreneurs,
which leads more entrepreneurs to act accordingly. More wealth creating en-
trepreneurs leads to higher economic growth. And since the creative power
of the rent-seeking entrepreneur often is overlooked, this could lead some-
one to believe that the society has become more entrepreneurial, while what
has really happened is that the creative power of the entrepreneur has been
channelled toward wealth creating activities. So the important motivational
factor is not the reputation of the entrepreneur, but the institutions that de-
termines their reward structure in the economy. If the institutions and reward
system is skewed toward rent-seeking entrepreneurs, then entrepreneurs will
end up with a bad reputation. For example if one thinks about present day
entrepreneurs like Bill Gates and the late Steve Jobs, they have a quite good
reputation, while entrepreneurs like Carlos Slim, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
Roman Abramovich don’t enjoy an equally pleasant reputation. The latter
entrepreneurs have also earned a lot of their wealth through rent-seeking.
So my guess is that the causality goes from wealth seeking entrepreneurs
through better reputation for the entrepreneur. Non-pecuniary rewards for
entrepreneurs are also discussed by Acemoglu (1995, pp. 28–32), he also
discusses the question about direction of causality.
The relative prices story is stressed by Allen (2009), as he writes about
the Newcomen engine:12 “Non-adoption was not due to ignorance: the New-
comen engine was well known as the wonder technology of its day . . . , nor was
it difficult to lure English mechanics abroad”. Allen’s argument is that since
the Newcomen engine was profitable in Britain it was implemented there, but
it was not economical on the continent and consequently not implemented.
This explanation is to a great extent coherent with the argument presented
12The Newcomen engine was the first practical device that harnessed the power of steam
to produce mechanical work.
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in this thesis. This also illustrate quite clearly that new technology is not
sufficient for wealth seeking entrepreneurs to act, they also need incentives
to introduce the new technology to the market. As Douglas North states:
“If the basic institutional framework makes income redistribution (piracy)
the preferred (most profitable) economic opportunity, we can expect a very
different development of knowledge and skills than a productivity-increasing
(the twentieth-century chemical manufacturer) economic opportunity would
entail” (North, 1990, p. 78).
Up until now I have only briefly touched upon rent-seeking. The term
rent-seeking was coined by Krueger (1974), and was first systematically dis-
cussed by Tullock (1967). Rent-seeking is a concept that is used to describe
the activity when someone attempt to obtain economic rent by manipulating
the social or political environment in which economic activities occur, rather
than generating new wealth. Examples of activities that are rent-seeking are
when somebody tries to obtain a monopoly that is not a natural monopoly;
this can be done in several ways. Either by influencing politicians to grant
them the right to operate their business as a monopoly or by forcing com-
peting firms out of their market in an illegitimate manner.13
It isn’t only that the economy could end up in a monopoly position that is
the wasteful part of rent-seeking. It is also socially wasteful when economic
agents deploy resources to ensure these monopoly rents. Buchanan et al.
(1980, pp. 12–14) identify three types of rent-seeking expenditures that
might be socially wasteful; (i) the effort and the expenditure of the potential
recipient of the monopoly rights, (ii) the effort of that government official to
obtain or to react to the expenditure of the potential recipient and (iii) third-
party distortions in induced by the monopoly itself or by the government as
a consequence of the rent-seeking activity.
Especially point (i) is important when it comes to rent-seeking entrepreneurs,
13For a textbook exposition of rent-seeking in the public choice literature see Mueller
(2003) especially chapter 15.
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if one accepts the assumption that high ability people can choose either to
become rent-seeking entrepreneurs or wealth creating entrepreneurs. Then
profitable opportunities for rent-seeking can be wasteful from the point of
view of the society.14 This is essentially the Murphy et al. (1991) story.
If entrepreneurial rent-seekers are risk takers as Knight (1934) argues, this
could have an interesting effect on rent-seeking under point (i). He pre-
dicts that the aggregated profit from rent-seeking entrepreneurs on average
will be negative owing to the overcompensation for profit by risk-taking en-
trepreneurs. Mueller (2003, p. 341) notes that this conclusion should hold
whether the rents comes from private market investments such as advertis-
ing and patenting, or from political markets such as campaign expenditure
or lobbying.
Argument (ii) can have at least two detrimental effects on the economy.
The first effect could be that the bureaucrat allocates resources toward rent-
seeking instead of doing their job; the second effect could be that a result
of the rent-seeking done by the bureaucrat can adversely affect R&D and
innovation. If this is the case this will result in fewer wealth creating en-
trepreneurs and lower economic growth, there are several contributions in
the literature that models this relationship. A simple, non-technical clear
discussion of this problem is given in (Murphy et al., 1993). Chaudhry and
Garner (2007) construct a model that incorporates a rent-seeking government
that can block innovation into a Schumpeterian growth model. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) has a similar discussion, Knutsen (2011a,b) discusses how
dictators choose to behave when it comes to innovation.
Other interesting studies that deal with rent-seeking are Mehlum et al.
(2003a,b), these two articles present a model of how mafia-like activities can
affect developing and transition economies. The model that is deployed in
these articles exhibits multiple equilibrium and bears some resemblance to
14Here it is important to remember that the wasteful effect of rent-seeking is not the
transfer of rent from one person to another, but that somebody uses resources to make
this transfer happen.
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Acemoglu (1995) in this respect. There is also a literature concerning the
“veracity effect”, which is: ”a more than proportional increase in aggregate
redistribution in response to an increase in the raw rate of return” (Lane and
Tornell, 1996, p. 226) is related to rent-seeking entrepreneurs. More recent
contributions that also relate to the “natural resource curse” includes Torvik
(2002), Do and Levchenko (2009), Perroni and Proto (2010) and Mehlum
et al. (2006) – which tests empirically whether or not resource curses are a
result of institutions, their findings implies this to be the case. They show
that resource abundant countries with weak institutions have a lower growth
rate than resource abundant countries with good institutions. An important
point in this article is that entrepreneurs in countries that have institutions
that make rents up for grabs goes into this line of business, and this has
negative effect on the rest of the economy since, talent are deployed at rent
grabbing instead of wealth creating activities.
The above-mentioned studies also points out that wealth creating en-
trepreneurs often are confronted with legal and environmental constraints.
They often need production permits, licenses, dispensations and so on. This
can result in request for government intervention and provides opportunities
for corruption. Moreover, the socially unproductive transfers that corruption
implies may constrain some entrepreneurial activity, given that entrepreneurs
may not have equal lobbying power compared to that of established firms, or
the same financial resources to pay bribes. This idea can be generalized as:
rent-seeking, by jeopardizing current entrepreneurial profits, limits its future
transfer opportunities (Mehlum et al., 2003b).
The actual effect of rent-seeking on innovation and economic growth are
not always clear cut. If rent-seeking is considered in reference to situations
that are not first best, but rather in situation that is more comparable to
actual condition in a given jurisdiction, the net effect could be positive, see
(Douhan and Henrekson, 2010). As Dejardin (2011) puts it “accepting the
rent-seeking behavior of some official (or even taking it as an opportunity)
13
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and bearing the cost of bribery may sometimes be the only way for an en-
trepreneur to make concrete efficiency-enhancing innovation.”
3.1 The cost of rent-seeking
There are several methods for estimating the economic loss from rent-seeking,
Del Rosal (2011) gives a good overview. He classifies the approaches to
estimating rent-seeking into four categories, (i) Building on the theoretical
literature, (ii) direct measures that can be taken as expenditures in rent-
seeking, (iii) rent-seeking consequences on a macroeconomic basis and (iv)
a group of relevant articles that doesn’t fit in to the taxonomy of the other
categories. I will mainly concentrate on the studies that fall into category
(iii), since these are the most relevant for the question investigated in this
thesis. I note the estimates in category (i) and (ii) fall into a wide range from
3% of GNP (Posner, 1975) to 30–45% of GNP (Mohammad and Whalley,
1984).15
There are some papers on rent-seeking and growth, most of these papers
only present an empirical study with no theoretical model underpinning there
empirical findings. In the eleven papers that Del Rosal (2011) surveys, only
two have a theoretical model, these papers are Magee et al. (1989, chapter 8)
and Murphy et al. (1991). Both of these studies use the number of lawyers
as a proxy for rent-seeking. Other studies use this proxy as well and also find
a negative effect on economic growth from the numbers for lawyer e.g., see
Courbois (1991); Laband and Sophocleus (1988).
There are also works on rent-seeking that attempt to link it with politi-
cal regimes, for example Dougan and Snyder (1993) studies the relationship
between government revenues and the political regime, they study authoritar-
ian versus democratic. Their finding implies that authoritarian regimes tend
to be associated with higher ratios of tariff revenues than do democracies.
15An even lower estimate is given in Mixon and McKenzie (1996), which comes up with
no effect of rent-seeking. This is done in an econometric framework.
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A paper by Svensson (2000) provides a study on the interaction between
the political process and foreign aid. His finding put forward that foreign
aid is linked with higher level of corruption; the proxy that is employed for
rent-seeking is ethnic diversity.
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In this section I will present two models where rent-seeking entrepreneurs
influences the economy. The presentation of these models follows closely the
presentations given in the original articles.
The first model Murphy et al. (1991) develops a framework for studying
how talent is allocated between two sectors in the economy. This model
demonstrates that if one sector is more open to rent-seeking and at the same
time this is a sector with the most talented entrepreneurs, this will have
negative consequences for the growth rate of the economy.
The second model Acemoglu (1995) develops a framework that shows that
the level of rent-seeking in an economy can have effects on the investment
rate. If there is a high level of rent-seekers; the model demonstrates that this
will result in a lower investment rate, since wealth-creating entrepreneurs will
not be the full recipient of their effort. The model also demonstrates that
there could be multiple equilibriums and that path dependency can make it
hard to break loose from an undesirable equilibrium.
4.1 Model for allocation of talent Murphy et al.
The model I present here is a two-sector growth model; the model is taken
from Murphy et al. (1991), and is based on Lucas (1978). In this model
people with high-ability becomes entrepreneurs and hire low-ability people
in their firms. The model has two types of entrepreneurs, wealth creating and
rent-seeking. In the population there is a distribution of abilities (1, a) with
a density function f(A). An individual’s ability is measured by how much
he can improve the technology which he operates. Ability in this model is
one-dimensional. Each person lives for one period and the distribution of
abilities is static. The economy consists of only one good, which is produced
by many firms. Each firm is organized by an entrepreneur. A firm that is
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organised by an entrepreneur with ability A, has profit given by
y = s · A · F (H)− w ·H. (4.1)
Where s is the common state of technology, F is the static over time pro-
duction function, H is the aggregate ability of all workers employed by this
entrepreneur, w is the workers’ wage and price of the good is normalised
to 1. Entrepreneurs takes the current state of technology s and the wage
w as given. Rent-seekers in this economy will cost the wealth-creating en-
trepreneur an amount T , so this leaves the profit for the wealth creating
entrepreneur to be (1− T )y.
The profit function given in (4.1) embodies the key assumption in this
model, which is that abler entrepreneurs can earn more than proportionally to
their ability from operating the same technology as the less able entrepreneurs
i.e., increasing return to ability. This is due to the property of A, which
only affects profits not cost. The concavity of the production function F
determines how the diminishing returns to scale affects the economy and
how many entrepreneurs that operate in it.
The first-order condition of 4.1 with respect to H is given by
s · A · F ′(A) = w. (4.2)
Equation 4.2 implies that more able people run larger firms. The model has
a possibility of only one entrepreneur, in the extreme case of constant return
to scale. A person becomes one of the two types of entrepreneurs when
s · A · F (H(A))− w ·H(A) > w · A, (4.3)
and a worker otherwise. The more able people become entrepreneurs in
equilibrium, and the less able ones become workers. There are two cut-off
ability levels A∗ and ξ, such that those with higher abilities become one of the
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two types of entrepreneurs and those with an ability lower than A∗ become
workers.
In equilibrium the wage adjust until the combined demand for workers
by the wealth creating and rent-seeking entrepreneurs is equal to the supply
of workers: ∫ A∗
1
Af(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
workers
=
∫ ξ
A∗
Af(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
rent-seekers
+
∫ 1
ξ
Af(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth creator
(4.4)
or ∫ A∗
1
Af(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
workers
=
∫ ξ
A∗
Af(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth creators
+
∫ 1
ξ
Af(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
rent-seekers
. (4.5)
Each person in the model lives for one period and has three choices,
wealth creating–, rent-seeking entrepreneur and worker. If he becomes an
wealth creating entrepreneur, he picks the size of his firm H(A) according to
(4.2) and earns a profit given by (4.1). The technology that is deployed by
the rent-seeking entrepreneur is also subject to increasing returns to ability
and diminishing returns to scale. It is assumed that the rents collected by a
rent-seeking entrepreneur with ability A is given by
R =
A ·G(H) · T · Y∫
AG(H)f(A)dA︸ ︷︷ ︸
rent-seekers
− w ·H, (4.6)
where H is the total human ability of workers that this rent-seeker employs,
Y is the aggregate profit of the entrepreneur and G(H) is the concave pro-
duction function for the rent-seeking entrepreneur. Here the share of total
gross rents T · Y collected by the rent-seeking entrepreneur of ability A is
proportional to A ·G(H). This means that the total gross rents collected by
rent-seeking entrepreneur automatically add up to the total revenues lost by
the wealth creating entrepreneur.
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The growth in this economy comes from last period’s best practice; this
means that the most able entrepreneur that operates in the wealth creating
sector determines the growth rate. It is assumed that the rent-seeking sector
has no productive component and hence does not contributes to the growth
rate. It is assumed that the state of the technology today is the state of the
last period times the ability of the ablest wealth creating entrepreneur in the
last period16:
s(t) = s(t−1)·(maximum ability of an wealth creating entrepreneur at t−1).
(4.7)
Equations 4.4 and 4.5 give the two different states the economy can op-
erate under. Which state an economy operates in is determined by the elas-
ticities of the production function (F ) and (G) whit respect to H. If the
economy is in the state described by 4.4, then the most talented person in
the economy has become a wealth creator. This happens because wealth cre-
ating is the most profitable option for this person in this economy. The result
is that the economy will experience its maximum growth rate – given by the
ability of the ablest person – described by equation 4.7. But since there are
rent-seekers present in this economy the level of income will be lower than
it will be without rent-seekers. The size of this income reduction due to the
rent-seeker is determined by the area between A∗ and ξ in 4.4.
The state described by equation 4.5 arises when the most profitable op-
portunities are in rent-seeking. When this happens this will have detrimental
effects on the economy, the most important effect is that the growth rate of
the economy will be lower than it otherwise would have been if wealth cre-
ating had been the more profitable choice. The reason is that now the most
talented person in the economy has become a rent-seeker and since rent-
seeking doesn’t add to the growth rate of the economy, the growth rate will
16This is also affected by the “genius explanation” of economic growth. Which states
that a larger population will tend to bring about more technological advances, due to
higher probability for geniuses see e.g. (Kuznets, 1960; Kremer, 1993).
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be determined by less able people. How much lower the growth rate will be
is determined by the size of the rent-seeking sector. The rent-seeking sector
also has an income-reducing effect in the same manner as it has under the
state described by equation 4.4.
In section 5 below, I have tried to empirically test this relationship. This
is done by using the college enrolment rate in social science, business and
law as a proxy for rent-seekers and the college enrolment rate in engineering
as a proxy for wealth creators. I have followed the method used in Murphy
et al. (1991), I use updated data and conduct a thorough robustness check
of the results.
4.2 An equilibrium model of the allocation of talent
(Acemoglu, 1995)
The model assumes that each agent has some talent, and that these talents
can be employed in two areas:
1. Productive activities, which is called entrepreneurship.
2. Unproductive activities, i.e., activities that bring positive return to the
individual but not to the society.
In this model, it is also assumed that the economy consists of a continuum
of identical agents, which is normalised to 1. Entrepreneurs in the model
undertake an ex ante investment that will determine their total production.
This production is equal to α+ x where x is the ex-ante investment. Invest-
ment is chosen for the set [0,∞) and has a cost c(·) which is convex in the set
[0,∞), which means c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0, limx→∞ c′(x) = 0 and c(0) = 0.
The entrepreneur is not able to keep all the revenue that he produces; there
is a probability that he will have to deal with a rent-seeker who will demand
a bribe. This leads to the entrepreneur losing a proportion (1−q) of his total
product. It is assumed in the model that the probability of having to deal
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with a rent-seeker is equal to the proportion of rent-seekers in the economy,
represented by p. This implies that the net return for the entrepreneur equal
to
(1− p+ pq)(α + x)− c(x). (4.8)
Gross revenue of entrepreneurship is α + x, the revenue is retained by the
entrepreneur with a probability (1 − p) and only a proportion q of it with
probability p, while the cost of investment is always sustained. It is assumed
in the model that all agents are wealthy enough to be able to undergo the
start-up investment without having to run into credit difficulties. The in-
vestment level is set to maximize this return which implies
x(p) = δ(1− p+ pq), (4.9)
where δ(·) is the inverse function of c′(·), and c′′(·) implies that x(p) is concave
in p. Form equation 4.9 one sees that p > 0 leads to underinvestments on the
part of the entrepreneur, since they are not the full recipient of their effort.
For a rent-seeker the payoff depends on the likelihood of obtaining bribes
from entrepreneurs. b denotes the proportion of agents that are entrepreneurs,
the bribe that a rent-seeker receives from an entrepreneur is denoted by R(p).
The amount that the rent-seeker is able to extract from an entrepreneur can
be a decreasing function of p because of competition among rent-seekers or
because the gross revenue of entrepreneur is decreasing in p – since they
choose to invest less.
It is also assumed that R′(·) ≤ 0 and R′′(·) ≤ 0. Thus, the expected
return to a rent-seeker to be given by
bR(p), (4.10)
from equation 4.8 there are pb entrepreneurs which meets a rent-seeker and
from equation 4.10 exactly the same number of rent-seekers meets an en-
trepreneur. Since all agents in this economy are identical – it follows that
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they must have the same expected return. And since b = 1− p this gives
(1− p+ pq)(α + x(p))− c(x(p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected net return to wealth creating entrepreneurs
= (1− p)R(p) (4.11)
The RHS of equation 4.11 is the return that the entrepreneur can expect to
earn if he chooses to become a rent-seeker.
I will refer to the LHS of equation 4.11 as VE and RHS as VR, Using the
first-order condition and equation 4.9, we can see that
dVE
dp
= −(1− p)(α + x(p)) < 0,
d2VE
dp2
= −(1− p)x′(p) > 0 (4.12)
and
dVR
dp
= −R(p) + (1− p)R′(p) < 0. (4.13)
Since both curves are downward sloping – shown in figure 1 – there can
be more than one intersection, how many are determined by the relative
position of these curves. There is no equilibrium where everyone becomes a
rent-seeker, to see this set p = 1 this gives VR = 0 but VE > 0 since p > 0.
Let us now consider the following conditions:
α + x(0)− c(x(0)) > R(0) (A)
∃p∗such that(1− p∗ + p∗q)(α + x(p∗))− c(x(p∗)) < (1− p∗)R(p∗). (B)
Condition A states that when there is no rent-seeking, the return to rent-
seeking is lower than that to entrepreneurship. Condition B tells us that
at some level of activity in the economy, rent-seeking is the more profitable
option. From these results we could state the following:
Proposition 1. 1. When condition A is satisfied but B is not satisfied,
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibriuma
aSource: Acemoglu (1995, p. 22)
there exists a unique equilibrium in which no agent chooses to become
a rent-seeker.
2. When both conditions are satisfied, there exist at least three equilibria,
equilibriums, one without and the others with rent-seeking.
Proof. The proof follows from figure 1 and equation 4.11. Supposed condition
A is fulfilled; the curve VE starts perpendicularly above VR which implies
that when there is no rent-seeking, the return to rent-seeking is less than
to entrepreneurship. Thus a situation deprived of any rent-seeking is an
equilibrium. Whether there are any more equilibria rest on the position of
the two curves. When assumption B is not satisfied, VE never falls below VR,
thus the unique equilibrium is given by the point p = 0. However, when VE
falls below VR at lease two more intersections must exist, since at p = 1 we
know that VE > VR.
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In the original paper Acemoglu expands the model so it becomes dynamic;
he shows that the model will have at least three equilibria. And that two
of these are stable – high level of rent-seeking and low level of rent-seeking
– he also has a very interesting discussion of the political economy of the
allocation of talent. In this example there is introduced a police force into
the dynamic model. The size of this police force can either be determined by
a government or by the preference of agents in the economy through voting.
A larger police force reduces incentive to choose rent-seeking i.e., VR shifts
down in figure 1, as a result entrepreneurship will be a more attractive choice
for future generations and unless the larger police force is prohibitively costly,
social welfare will increase.
4.3 Applying the models
The two models I have presented above highlights how rent-seeking affects
the society, the Murphy at al. model demonstrates how rent-seeking in com-
bination with the allocation of talent can negatively affect economic growth.
The Acemoglu model demonstrates how different level of rent-seeking can
affect the investment rate in the economy. As for all economic models one
has to ask oneself the important question, are these models able to explain
real life events? Indeed, the analysis done in Murphy et al. (1991) shows
that the main implication from these model finds support in the data. The
original results are reproduced in appendix B, as I show in section 5 I am
not able to reproduce these results.
In the empirical part of the thesis I try to estimate the effect of rent-
seeking entrepreneurs on the economy. Most of my regression fails to show
significance, and I am therefore not able to point to which of the two models
that best explains how rent-seeking entrepreneurs affects the economy. The
plan was to see this by looking at the direct and indirect effects of the law
and engineering variables that I deploy. So I can only refer to what Murphy
et al. (1991) finds in their article: “the evidence from the reduced sample
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might mean that the most important effect the lawyers on growth is the
opportunity cost of not having talented people as innovators. The small
indirect effect suggests that lawyers reduced growth creating activities but
not through reducing the incentive to invest.”
The only thing I could point to in my findings is the strange behaviour
of the law variable in the jackknifing estimation done in section 5.4, espe-
cially the figure 3e and 3g. These findings could suggest that lawyers have
different effect in different countries, and that in some countries they are
growth enhancing and in others they have a negative effect on growth. This
could also point to the case of multiple equilibria put forward by the model
in Acemoglu (1995).
I also think it is possible to look at historical events, and make certain
claims that the models highlights what’s were going on. For example the
Murphy at al. model can illuminate what was going on in Russia between
the 80s and up until now. In the early 80s through the early 90s Russia was
in a state described by 4.5 i.e., if you where an ambitious young Russian at
the time you would have join the bureaucracy or the KGB to try to enrich
yourself. Unfortunately for you this system was overstretched – there were
too much rent-seeking going on – and the system collapsed in 1991.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new governments in the
post-Soviet and other ex-communist states carried out “shock therapy” that
gave talented people – with often a background in engineering17 – an oppor-
tunity to take control of some of the biggest companies in Russia. At this
time in the 90s talented people gravitated towards the private market, and
it is in some sense possible to argue that the Russian economy at that time
was in a state described by 4.4. I know that this is highly disputed – there
17Most of the people know as the Russian oligarchs are engineer graduates; Boris Bere-
zovsky was a mathematician , Mikhail Khodorkovsky was a bureaucrat/politician, Alex
Konanykhin studied at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Mikhail Fridman
graduated from Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys, Vitaly Malkin holds a doctorate
from Moscow Institute for Transport Engineering and Vladimir Potanin is an economist.
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was a lot of rent-seeking going on at the time – but it is also true that the
Russian economy had a high growth rate at that time and that the oligarchs
and people working for them where highly talented.
This all changed in the early 2000’s when Vladimir Putin became presi-
dent; he took control of the private market and redistributed power from the
oligarchy to the Russian state. The result of this was that talented people
started to gravitate toward the bureaucracy instead of taking up work in the
market, it can be argued that the economy returned to the state described by
4.5, see the Economist (2010) “surveys now show that the young would rather
have a job in the government or a state firm than in a private business”.
The model by Acemoglu can also describe historical events, there have
been put forward numerous explanations for why the Industrial Revolution
happened in England. I have touched upon some of them in section 3. I
think Acemoglu’s model can contribute to this discussion. Mokyr (2010) ar-
gues that during the Industrial Revolution there was a “gentleman mentality”
that made business much easier. This in turn channeled entrepreneurs in to
wealth creating entrepreneurship. One of the things this gentlemen men-
tality did was to make credit more available for the entrepreneur’s. This
was extremely important at the time – since the possibility of getting cap-
ital through joint stock were nearly impossible – due to the Bubble Act.18
Therefore the entrepreneurs needed this kind of networks to make the credit
market function. Munro (2010, p. 137) speculates that: “[V]irtual absence
of joint-stock financing made entrepreneurial profit reinvestment (or profit
retention) all the more important for industrial capital formation during that
early, pre-1825 phase, of the Industrial Revolution.”
In the Acemoglu model this will be represented by either that it is only
condition A that holds, or that the level of p∗ in condition B is such that there
exists an equilibrium with a low level of rent-seeking. From what is argued
18The Bubble Act or more formally “statute 6 George I cap. 18” was an Act of the
Parliament of Great Britain that forbade all joint-stock companies not authorised by royal
charter Munro (2010).
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by Mokyr (2010) most of the rents created by the inventions during the
Industrial Revolution were collected by the entrepreneur and his financier.
The most probable is that England at this time was in an equilibrium with
low level of rent-seeking. Leading to a higher investment rates than under
previous equilibriums with higher amount of rent-seekers. Low level is meant
in historical terms and in comparison with other countries at the time, the
level of rent-seeking during the Industrial Revolution was probably higher
than what it is today.
It could of course be the Murphy at al. story that explained the Industrial
Revolution, but this does not seem plausible, since most of the occupations
that are lucrative for conducting rent-seeking were closed to most of the
talent pool. As Mokyr (2010, p. 186) points out; “[C]areers in the military,
the civil service, and politics were still by and large reserved to members of
the privileged Anglican landowning classes.”
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“I checked it very thoroughly,” said the computer, “and that quite
definitely is the answer. I think the problem, to be quite honest
with you, is that you’ve never actually known what the question
is.”
– Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
In this section I re-estimate the results from Murphy et al. (1991). The
main finding in the original study is that there is reason to believe that there
is a positive relationship between the share of students in engineering and
economic growth and a negative relationship when it comes to the share of
students enrolled in law. I am only able to some extent to corroborate their
results.
5.1 Data
The dataset I use constitutes of seven variables with 103 observations. Table
A.I in appendix A gives an overview of which countries that are included in
the dataset and which year the different variables span. The left-hand side
variable is average yearly percentage GDP growth in the period 1998–2009.
The variable is calculated from the variable “rgdpl” found in Penn World
Table (PWT) version 7.0 Heston et al. (2011).19 Specifically at the variable
“rgdpl” stands for: real GDP per capita (2005 constant price international
dollar: laspeyres). The variable log(rgdpl.1983) is the logarithm of the level
of GDP in 1983, it is included for controlling for convergence in the growth
rates, this variable is also from Heston et al. (2011). This variable did not
have observations on all the 103 countries that are included in the dataset. I
have therefore used the closest observation, unfortunately there is sometimes
19The method I have used for calculating is:
(((
11
√
GDP2009
GDP1998
)
− 1
)
× 100
)
=
average yearly percentage GDP growth.
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a considerable time gap between when the variable should ideally have been
recorded and when it actually is recorded.20 As can be seen from table 8
the inclusion of these observations changes the results considerably. More
on this below in section 5.4. “ki” and “kg” is the investment share and the
consumption share of real GDP respectively also Heston et al. (2011).
Primary.school.enrollment.1983 is the variable “SE.PRM.ENRR” from
the world development indicators (WDI) World Bank (2012). This variable
measures enrolment in primary school as a percentage of the population that
was eligible for primary school in 1983. This variable is also ridden by the
problem that not all countries have observations for 1983.21
The variable coups are from Polity IV (2010) Coups d’Etat data, the
variable corresponds to “numbers of revolution and coups” in the original
study – I have made a dummy variable that take the value 1, if one of four
conditions – successful, attempted, plotted, and alleged coup events – in the
polity IV Coups d’Etat data is true during the time period 1998–2009. The
original source for the viable used in Murphy et al. (1991) was Banks (1979),
since this data is behind a pay wall I had to use data from another source.
The Source for the variables law– and engineering share is UNESCO
Institute for Statistics UIS (2012). These variables doesn’t map completely
onto the variables used by Murphy et al. (1991). The reason for this is that
UNESCO has changed the coding for these variables. The biggest difference
is between the law share used in the original study and the one that I make
use of. My variable is much broader than the the one used in their study.
The full name of my variable is: “Enrolment in social science, business and
law”. This means that social science and business is also included, in addition
to law. I don’t see this as a major problem; since people trained in social
20Countries with missing observations: Azerbaijan, Croatia, Czech Republic, Eritrea,
Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Tajikistan.
21Countries with missing observations : Azerbaijan, Croatia, Eritrea, Georgia, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Namibia, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
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science and business often are often find in the same line of work as people
with a law degree, and should therefore be equally good at rent-seeking.
The observation contained in the engineering share variable is: “Enrolment
in engineering, manufacturing and construction.” The engineering variable
seems to map the original data better. An indication that this is the case
can be seen from table 2 and B.II. Here one could see that the mean value
of engineering in 1970 was 10.39% and in 1998 12.48%, while the change in
the law variable is much larger. The mean of the law variable in 1970 was
8.89% and in 1998 33.19%.
Another problem with the data on these two variables was that not all
countries recorded data in the year 1998. I therefore had to use observations
from the closest year to 1998, there were often a substantial time gap between
when the variable actually was recorded and when it’s ideally should have
been recorded. Table A.I in appendix A presents a complete list of which
year the different variables that are used in the dataset are recorded. As can
be seen from comparing table 2 and B.II, the change in the engineering share
variable between 1970–1998 was only 1.28 percentage points. This gives me
reason to believe that the year by year change of the law and engineering
variables are small. I therefore think it is acceptable to use observations from
later years as a proxy for observation in 1998.
5.2 Results
I have followed Murphy et al. (1991) quite closely when I have conducted
these regressions. As they did I find that some of the variables in the regres-
sions are statistically significant. I will first start with a short description
of the original findings, I have reproduced the original tables in appendix B
table B.II to B.VI.
When they run regressions for the full set of countries and only controls
for GDP level in 1960, there findings is that there is a positive relationship
between engineering and growth, for law this relationship is insignificant but
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Table 2: Summary statistics for engineering and law majors as percentage of
college students
Full sample Countries with 10,000
or more students
Engineering Law Engineering Law
Mean 12.48 33.19 13.76 33.41
Median 11.49 33.48 12.23 33.48
25th percentile 7.43 26.66 9.20 26.60
75th percentile 17.34 40.45 18.05 40.46
has the “correct” sign. This result can be found in table B.II.
When they include more of the variables that are common in cross sec-
tion growth regressions – investment share, government consumption share,
primary school enrolment and revolution and coups – they don’t find as sig-
nificant relationship on the full sample. But when they reduce the sample
and only include countries with more than 10,000 students they find a sta-
tistically significant relationship between economic growth and engineering –
and law share. Results can be found in table B.III. As I will show in section
5.4 – based on my dataset – it is possible to find the results you want just
by being lucky whit which countries are included and not included based on
arbitrary exclusion criteria.
It is impossible for me to say if this is the case with the original data –
despite strenuous efforts – I have not had any luck at tracking down the data
used in the original article.22
From table B.IV one can see that in the original study, the effects of law
enrolment on growth are trivial. As I point out on page 25, the interpretation
of this is that the most important effect of lawyers on growth is the loss of
talent, that otherwise could have been deployed more economically.
I first run the regression were I only included the law–, engineering share
variables and the log of real GDP per capita in 1983. As can be seen from ta-
22I have emailed all of the authors of the original article and asked them for the dataset,
but they haven’t responded.
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Table 3: Regression of growth on proportions of majors in engineering and
law
All countries > 10,000 Students
(Intercept) 5.43∗∗ 10.09∗∗∗
(1.93) (2.04)
log(rgdpl.1983) −0.31 −0.72∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.20)
law.share −0.02 −0.04†
(0.02) (0.02)
engineering.share 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
N 103 85
R2 0.04 0.15
adj. R2 0.01 0.12
Resid. sd 2.36 2.03
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
ble B.III, Murphy et al. (1991) finds a strong significant relationship between
engineering and growth, in contrast with my results found in table 3 they
don’t find a statistically significant relationship between law and growth.
My result is significant at a 10% confidence level. That the log(rgdpl.1983)
is negative and significant is as expected, and suggests that there has been
convergence and that low income countries grow faster than high-income
countries. This is in line with the Solow growth model.
When comparing my result with the original results, one sees that the
original findings are much stronger than what I have been able to find. As
I will show in section 5.4 this could be due to which countries are included
and which are not.
I have followed the original study and run the regression on a subset of
the observations were college enrolment is higher than 10,000. The reason
for why this is done is to reduce the problem of college attendance abroad.
Murphy et al. (1991) argues that this approach is preferable than to run
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population weighted regressions, since some large population countries have
a significant commitment to education abroad. By looking at my result and
contrasting them with the original results one sees that college enrolment has
probably risen since 1970. Since there are only eighteen countries with less
than 10,000 students enrolled in college.
In table 4 I have run the full regression model as the table shows both law
and engineering fall short of being significant. They both show the “right”
signs negative for law and positive for engineering. In the original paper they
decompose the effect of engineering and law into direct and indirect effects,
I think it’s a bit farfetch to do that here since my results fall short of being
significant. So I have therefore dropped this. The regression model that I
have used for the regressions in table 4:
log (GDP per capita)i,2009 = β0 + β1 log(GDP per capita)i,1983
+ β2(kg)i,1998 + β3(ki)i,1998 + β4(law.share)i,1998
+ β5(engineering share)i,1998
+ β6(Primary school enrollment)i,1983
+ β7(coups)i + i (5.1)
.
The β coefficient for ”kg” in table 4 is somewhat confusing, for the reduced
sample ”kg” is positive and significant at a 10% level. This is not in line
with theories of rent-seeking where government consumption mostly is seen
as growth reducing. The fact the β coefficient for coups is positive and
significant is also very strange, I am not able to offer any explanation for
this relationship. The primary school enrolment variable is significant and
positive in both the regressions, this is expected to be the case and show
similar results as Murphy et al. (1991) The results are also in the same
ballpark 0.03 vs. 0.02 for “All countries”.
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Table 4: Determinants of growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1998
and 2009
All countries > 10,000 Students
(Intercept) 4.26∗ 6.42∗
(2.08) (2.82)
log(rgdpl.1983) −0.43∗ −0.79∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.17)
kg −0.00 0.01†
(0.01) (0.01)
ki 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
law.share −0.03 −0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
engineering.share 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Primary.school.enrollment.1983 0.03∗∗ 0.02†
(0.01) (0.01)
coups 1.63† 1.56
(0.85) (1.91)
N 103 85
R2 0.16 0.27
adj. R2 0.09 0.20
Resid. sd 2.26 1.94
Standard errors in parentheses (Robust standard errors for “> 10,000 Students”
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
5.3 Regression diagnostics
5.3.1 Detecting the presence of heteroscedasticity
The problem of heteroscedasticity arises when the error term  doesn’t fulfil
the criteria of having a uniform variance, i.e., Ei 6= σ2. If there is presence of
heteroscedasticity in the data, the OLS estimator is still unbiased but since
 doesn’t have a uniform variance the standard errors of the β coefficient are
larger. There are several ways of detecting heteroscedasticity; one simple way
to go about is looking at a residual plot. The residual plot for the regression
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Table 5: Auxiliary regressions
All countries > 10,000 Students
Auxiliary regressions Engineering
(Intercept) 2.16 2.54
(5.69) (6.96)
log(rgdpl.1983) 1.29∗ 1.14
(0.59) (0.72)
ki 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Primary.school.enrollment.1983 0.00 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
kg −0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.03)
coups −3.42 −4.05
(2.62) (2.80)
Auxiliary regressions Law
(Intercept) 43.60∗∗∗ 45.47∗∗∗
(8.25) (8.99)
log(rgdpl.1983) −2.04∗ −1.75†
(0.86) (0.93)
ki −0.00 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Primary.school.enrollment.1983 0.10∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
kg −0.03 −0.08∗
(0.02) (0.03)
coups −3.12 −7.63∗
(3.79) (3.62)
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
run in table 1 can be found in figure 2.
From the plot in figure 2 there is reason to believe that heteroscedasticity
might be a problem, I therefore conduct an Breusch-Pagen test23 (B-P),
23The test was independently suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Cook and
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(a) All countries table 3 (b) > 10,000 Students table 3
(c) All countries table 4 (d) > 10,000 Students table 4
Figure 2: Residuals
the key idea behind this test is based on viewing the squared residuals as
“estimates” of the variance of the respective observations error. For the
B-P test the H0 is homoskedastisity and H1 is heteroscedasticity. For the
regressions run in table 3, the B-P test shows for “All countries”: BP =
6.29, df = 3, p-value = 0.098 and for “> 10,000 Students”: BP = 5.04, df
= 3, p-value = 0.169. From the result that the B-P test gives there is no
reason to believe that there is a problem with heteroscedasticity in the data
Weisberg (1983)
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underlying the result given in table 3, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
homoskedastisity at a 5% significance level.
The B-P test for “All countries” in table 4 is BP = 13.19, df = 7, p-
value = 0.068, This means that I cannot reject homoscedasticity at a 5%
significance level. For “> 10,000 Students” the test shows: BP = 19.35, df
= 7, p-value = 0.0072 which gives me reason to reject H0 and and accepts
H1,t this regression suffer from heteroscedasticity at a 5% significance level.
A common way to remedy the effect of heteroscedasticity is to use so-
called robust standard errors, which could be calculated from using the co-
variance matrix. There exist several ways of estimating this matrix, the
first estimation technique was suggested by White (1980). The estimation
technique I use here is develop by MacKinnon and White (1985).
For the regression model given in 5.1 rewritten in matrix form: yi =
x>i β + i the coeffients β can be consistently estimated by OLS by using the
OLS estimator βˆ with an OlS residuals ˆi is given by:
βˆ = X>X)−1X>y (5.2)
ˆ = (In −H)u = (In −X(X>X)−1X>) (5.3)
where In is the n-dimensional identity matrix and H is the hat matrix. The
standard covariance matrix in an OLS model is given by:
Ψ = VAR[βˆ] =
(
X>X
)−1
X>ΩX
(
X>X
)−1
(5.4)
.
What kind of estimators that should be used for Φ depends on the
assumptions about Ω, for OLS it is assumed that the residuals are ho-
moscedastic whit variance σ2 which yields Ω = σ2I and Φ = σ2(X>X)−1
which can be consistently estimated by plugging in the OLS estimator σˆ2 =
(n− k)−1∑ni=1 uˆ2i . This is the regression method that underlies the OLS es-
timation done in all the regressions found in this thesis, except the regression
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that underlies the results are given in table 4 column “> 10,000 Students”.
The B-P test given above shows this regression suffers from heteroscedas-
ticity. I therefore have to use and at the estimation of Ω than Ω = σ2I.
This is done by using Ωˆ instead of Ω in 5.4, more specifically replacing the
diagonal elements of Ω whit Ωˆ = diag(ω1, . . . , ωn) where ωi is:
ωi =
ˆ2i
(1− hi)2 (5.5)
where hi = Hii are the diagonal element of the hat matrix.
5.3.2 Detecting the presence of multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is not a severe problem for ordinary least square estima-
tion, the reason for this is that multicollinearity doesn’t lead to bias of the β
coefficients. Multicollinearity only leads to higher variance of the OLS esti-
mator, the R2 statistic is unaffected and OLS is still the best linear unbiased
estimator.
Table 6: Correlation matrix
log
rgdpl
1983
kg ki law
share
engineering
share
Primary
school
coups
rgdpl 1.000 -0.101 0.209 -0.164 0.260 0.221 -0.113
kg -0.101 1.000 -0.125 -0.141 -0.172 -0.202 0.034
ki 0.209 -0.125 1.000 0.008 0.130 0.178 -0.062
law -0.164 -0.141 0.008 1.000 -0.081 0.220 -0.081
engineering 0.260 -0.172 0.130 -0.081 1.000 0.106 -0.160
Primary 0.221 -0.202 0.178 0.220 0.106 1.000 -0.102
coups -0.113 0.034 -0.062 -0.081 -0.160 -0.102 1.000
There are several methods for detecting multicollinearity; I will present
two methods here. The first method is to look at the correlation matrix; this
matrix can be found in table 6. By looking at this table there is no reason to
believe there is a problem with multicollinearity. But just to be sure that this
is correct I will also use the inverse of the correlation matrix. The diagonal
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elements of this matrix are called variance inflation factor (VIF), and are
given by (1−R2i )−1 where R2i is the R2 from regressing the ith independent
variable on all the other independent variables.
Table 7: Variance inflation factor
Dependent varible VIFi
log(rgdpl 1983) 1.204
kg 1.092
ki 1.078
law share 1.138
engineering share 1.130
Primary school enrollment 1983 1.178
coups 1.047
According to Kennedy (2008, p. 199) a VIFi > 10 indicates harmful
collinearity, as seen from table 7 this is not the case here. This leads me to
conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem in this regression.
5.4 Sensitivity
As pointed out above, I am not able to fully recreate the results from the
original article. For me this was a bit surprising, since regressions I run
on the dataset while I was compiling it were showing promising results. In
table 8 I present some of the results from the preliminary dataset. Especially
model 1 and 2 in table 8 were promising, the only difference between the data
underlying these regressions and the data underlying the regressions found in
table 3 and 4 column “All countries” is that there were 16 fewer observation
in the dataset used for table 8, the results in Model 3–4 uses the exclusion
criteria “> 10,000 Students”.
The only dissimilarity between the dataset underlying the regression re-
sults found in table 8 and the dataset that are used for the results that are
given in section 5.2, is that I have only included the countries that actually
have observations on the GDP level in 1983. It is possible to put forward
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Table 8: Sensitivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 6.91∗∗∗ 4.69∗∗ 8.41∗∗∗ 5.03∗∗
(1.62) (1.67) (1.65) (1.79)
log(rgdpl.1983) −0.49∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
law.share −0.03† −0.04∗ −0.04† −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
engineering.share 0.06∗ 0.07∗ 0.04 0.05†
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
kg 0.01∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
ki 0.00 0.01†
(0.00) (0.00)
Primary.school.enrollment.1983 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
coups 0.37 0.51
(0.69) (0.65)
N 87 87 71 71
R2 0.14 0.27 0.21 0.38
adj. R2 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.31
Resid. sd 1.81 1.71 1.55 1.42
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
arguments for why it is correct to used data from other years to fill in as I
have done in section 5.2. The reason why this could be a good idea is that
most of the countries that have missing data are regions that later become
countries, most of them are in the Eastern bloc. For example Azerbaijan
didn’t exist as a country in 1983 but it was still a region that was recognised
and since data from that period for the countries in question are known to
be of questionable quality – it could actually be better to use data from the
early 90s than the data recorded by the Soviet Union. Data are recorded by
the Soviet Union at the time are widely known to be inflated (A˚slund, 2007).
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But on the other hand one could also put forward the argument that these
countries shouldn’t be included since there didn’t exist as countries at that
time. So by choosing which of these two arguments one wants to follow one
could also choose if the regressions become significant or not.
I have therefore tried to test whether or not the true relationship is the
one given in table 8 or if this is due to a statistical arbitrariness. I have
resampled my dataset 1 million times by drawing 87 observations from the
original dataset. I Than run the regression model on the 1 million datasets
without testing or controlling for heteroscedasticity. I have summarised the
results from this regressions in table 9 and figure 3. To control whether
or not the countries with missing GDP where biasing my results, I have
also resampled data from the dataset without these countries. I have drawn
69 observations of the 87 observations 1 million times and then run the
regressions on these data sets. As can be seen from figure 3e and 3g there is
something strange with this data.
This statistical technique that I have deployed here is called jackknif-
ing and is similar to bootstrapping, but where bootstrapping replaces the
dropped data with estimates drawn from a statistical distribution based on
an estimation of the empirical distribution of the dataset. Jackknifing does
not replace the dropped data. The technique was first suggested by Que-
nouille (1956), where he introduces this technique for reducing biased in a
serially correlated estimator. The technique was further developed by Tukey
(1958), for a somewhat old review of jackknifing see Miller (1979). The jack-
knifing procedure also makes the results robust against outliers. For more
on bootstrapping see (Horowitz, 2001).
I have only removed 16 out of 103 and 18 out of 87 observations for
doing the resampling operation, it can seem like I have dropped too few
observations and that I would draw the same dataset several times. If this had
been the case this could have biased the results, but this is not the case the
combination of datasets that are possible to draw are truly astronomical. The
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Table 9: Percentage of significant results
Mean Median s.d.a
p < .10b p < .05c t-value t-value t-value
87 out of 103
All countries
law 30.04% 9.36% −1.42 −1.43 0.43
engineering 17.61% 6.16% 1.26 1.22 0.42
law and engineering 7.63% 1.44%
> 10,000
law 32.59% 13.63% −1.44 −1.45 0.49
engineering 12.01% 4.26% 1.12 1.07 0.44
law and engineering 4.81% 1.14%
69 out of 87
All countries
law 67.46% 46.54% −1.32 −1.74 1.48
engineering 91.57% 76.43% 2.28 2.28 0.48
law and engineering 61.26% 35.54%
> 10,000
law 41.80% 24.09% −0.23 −0.85 1.62
engineering 64.51% 42.83% 1.80 1.86 0.68
law and engineering 28.28% 12.15%
aStandard deviation
b(t-value > 1.64)
c(t-value > 1.96)
probability of drawing the same dataset at least two times is 1/2.245547× 1012
and 1/1.923856× 1012 respectively.24
The result from the jackknifing estimations – done on the 87 out of 103
(87/103) datasets – reveals that the findings in the preliminary dataset were
due to a statistical anomaly, the case that both engineering and law share
turn up as significant at t-value > 1.64 only happens in 7.63% of the re-
24 103!
87!·16!/(1× 106) = 2.245547× 1012 and 87!69!·18!/(1× 106) = 1.923856× 1012
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(a) Law (b) Engineering (c) Law (d) Engineering
(e) Law (f) Engineering (g) Law (h) Engineering
Figure 3: Histograms of the t-valuesa,b
aFigure 3a and 3b 87 out of 103 “All countries”, figure 3c and 3d 87 out of 103 “Student
enrolment > 10,000”.
bFigure 3e and 3f 69 out of 87 “All countries”, figure 3g and 3h 69 out of 87 “Student
enrolment > 10,000”
gressions. In table 9 I have summarised my findings, and from this it can
be seen that finding and significant a negative effect of the law share turns
up relatively often, respectively 30.04% for a t-value > 1.64 and 9.36% for
t-value > 1.96. For the (87/103) datasets, neither law nor engineering share
is significant with the “wrong” sign i.e., β value of law is always negative and
β value of engineering is always positive when significant. The mean t-value
for engineering is 1.27 with a standard deviation of 0.42 and for law is -1.41
with a standard deviation of 0.43. This means that significance with a con-
fidence interval of 90% is within the standard deviation for both variables.
But as table 9 shows it is quite seldom that the two variables are jointly
significant, this only happens in 7.68% and 1.44% for a p-value of 0.1 and
0.05 respectively.
Another interesting observation that can be done from table 9 is that the
mean and median are not equal to each other, except for engineering in the
69 out of 87 (69/87) “all countries”. This implies that even though I have run
43
Sensitivity
5 EMPIRICAL TESTING OF MURPHY ET AL. (1991)
1 million regressions the distribution of the p-values may not follow a normal
distribution. For the (69/87) datasets this is definitely the case, as can be
seen from figure 3e and 3g which displays a twin peaked distribution. I can
only speculate on why the law variable exhibits this strange behaviour, my
guess is that either there is an interaction effect which leads the law variable
to have different effects in high and low income countries. Or it could be due
to some sort of non-linear relationship between the law variable and economic
growth.
To check for any interaction effects, I have run the regression with the
interaction term law.share2. The histogram of the t-value for the interac-
tion term showed a multimodal distribution, with the majority the estimates
suggesting that are law.share2 negative.25 This suggests that the law share
effect on growth either stabilises or displays a hump shaped relationship. A
hump shape relationship seems plausible, since this will imply that economic
growth will suffer in an economy with too few or too many people with a
background in business, social science and law.
It would have been very interesting to see if the original data used by
Murphy et al. (1991) exhibits the same strange behaviour as I have found
here, but as I mentioned above I haven’t been able to get hold of the original
dataset.
The law variable is a tricky variable to interpret; every country needs
bureaucrats with a background in social science, law and business. But if
this sector becomes too big this will have negative effects, it could be that
highly talented people becomes bureaucrats and this takes this highly tal-
ented people of way from the wealth creating sector of the economy. This is
essentially the story described by equation 4.5. Or it could be that a big bu-
reaucracy leads to higher level of rent-seeking, if there are not enough checks
and balances on the bureaucrats. People with a background in social science,
business and law are also essential to a modern economy. As pointed out by
25The histogram can be found in appendix C
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North (1990) transaction costs tend to increase when an economy becomes
more complex and this leads to higher demand of bureaucrats. The results
given in figure 3e and 3g shows that in some combination of countries the
law variable could have a positive effect on economic growth. This suggests
that North’s transaction cost story could be an explanation for these results.
Apart from the fact that the results are sensitive to which countries that
are included in the analysis, it could also be the case that the result would
be sensitive to the source of the economic growth variable. Ciccone and
Jarocin´ski (2010) has tested this and finds that which variables that are
robust for explaining economic growth depends on the data source of the
growth variable. In the article they used data from WDI and the PWT and
also different versions of the PWT, their findings is that which variable that
are explaining economic growth differs between which dataset are deployed
in the regressions. I have not tested my results against other sources for the
economic growth variable, so I am not able to say if this is the case here.
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis I have demonstrated that rent-seeking can have several effects
on wealth-creating entrepreneurs. I have given a presentation of two models
that shows different effects, the model by Murphy et al. (1991) highlights
the allocation of talent. While the model by Acemoglu (1995) shows that an
economy with a high level of rent-seeking will have fewer people that choose
to become a wealth creating entrepreneurs since they will not be the full
recipient of their effort.
I have further demonstrated that both models can be applied at explain-
ing events in economic history. The Murphy et al. (1991) story can be used
to highlight the history of entrepreneurs in Russia since the mid-80s. While
the Acemoglu model, can be seen as illuminating some of the causes for the
Industrial Revolution.
In the empirical part of the thesis I have demonstrated that the estimation
technique used by Murphy at Al fall short of being significant on updated
data. Some of my results show signs of significance and suggests a negative
correlation between the share of student enrolled in business, social science
and law and economic growth. The results cannot be interpreted as causal,
and as the section on sensitivity suggests there may be a non-linear relation-
ship between the two variables. Results found by the jackknifing procedure
points to a broader problem with cross-country growth regressions, these re-
gressions seem to be very sensitive to small changes in the underlying data.
This procedure also demonstrates that it is possible to alter the results by
conducting some data mining.
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A DATA COVERAGE
A Data coverage
Table A.I: Data coverage
Country school law and enginer-
ing share
g1983
Albania 1983 2000 1983
Algeria 1983 2004 1983
Angola 1983 1999 1983
Argentina 1983 2003 1983
Australia 1983 1998 1983
Austria 1983 1999 1983
Azerbaijan 1981 2008 1992
Bangladesh 1983 2001 1983
Belgium 1983 2000 1983
Bolivia 1983 2000 1983
Brazil 1983 2002 1983
Brunei 1983 1999 1983
Bulgaria 1983 1999 1983
Burkina Faso 1983 2006 1983
Burundi 1983 2002 1983
Cambodia 1983 2001 1983
Cameroon 1983 2004 1983
Canada 1983 1998 1983
Cape Verde 1983 2008 1983
Chile 1983 2002 1983
Colombia 1983 2001 1983
Congo, Republic of 1983 2002 1983
Costa Rica 1983 2004 1983
Cote d’Ivoire 1983 2007 1983
Croatia 1992 1999 1989
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Table A.I: (continued)
Country school law and enginer-
ing share
g1983
Cuba 1983 2006 1983
Cyprus 1983 1999 1983
Czech Republic 1983 1999 1989
Denmark 1983 1999 1983
Djibouti 1983 2001 1983
El Salvador 1983 2002 1983
Eritrea 1988 1999 1991
Estonia 1983 1999 1989
Ethiopia 1983 1999 1983
Finland 1983 1998 1983
France 1983 2006 1983
Georgia 1981 1999 1992
Greece 1983 2002 1983
Guatemala 1983 2002 1983
Guinea 1983 2004 1983
Guyana 1983 2004 1983
Honduras 1983 2003 1983
Hungary 1983 1999 1983
Iceland 1983 1998 1983
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1983 2004 1983
Iraq 1983 2000 1983
Ireland 1983 1998 1983
Israel 1983 1999 1983
Italy 1983 1999 1983
Japan 1983 1998 1983
Jordan 1983 2003 1983
Kenya 1983 2000 1983
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Table A.I: (continued)
Country school law and enginer-
ing share
g1983
Korea, Republic of 1983 1998 1983
Kyrgyzstan 1981 2001 1992
Laos 1983 2000 1983
Latvia 1983 1999 1992
Lebanon 1983 2000 1983
Lesotho 1983 2005 1983
Liberia 1980 1999 1983
Libya 1983 2000 1985
Lithuania 1981 1999 1992
Luxembourg 1983 2006 1983
Macedonia 1992 1999 1989
Madagascar 1983 2005 1983
Malaysia 1983 2002 1983
Malta 1983 1999 1983
Mexico 1983 1999 1983
Mongolia 1983 1999 1983
Morocco 1983 1999 1983
Mozambique 1983 2004 1983
Namibia 1988 1998 1983
Netherlands 1983 1999 1983
New Zealand 1983 1998 1983
Norway 1983 1998 1983
Oman 1983 2005 1983
Panama 1983 2002 1983
Philippines 1983 2003 1983
Poland 1983 1998 1983
Portugal 1983 2000 1983
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Table A.I: (continued)
Country school law and enginer-
ing share
g1983
Qatar 1983 2001 1985
Romania 1988 1999 1983
Samoa 1983 2000 1983
Saudi Arabia 1979 2000 1985
Sierra Leone 1983 2000 1983
Slovak Republic 1992 1999 1986
Slovenia 1983 1999 1989
Spain 1983 1999 1983
Suriname 1983 2002 1983
Swaziland 1983 1999 1983
Sweden 1983 1999 1983
Switzerland 1983 1999 1983
Tajikistan 1990 2000 1992
Tanzania 1983 1999 1983
Trinidad & Tobago 1983 2000 1983
Tunisia 1983 2003 1983
Turkey 1983 1998 1983
Uganda 1983 1999 1983
Ukraine 1983 1999 1992
United Kingdom 1983 1999 1983
United States of America 1983 2005 1983
Uruguay 1983 2007 1983
Uzbekistan 1981 2006 1989
Venezuela 1983 2008 1983
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B Original
Table B.II: Summary statistics for engineering and law majors as percentage
of college students
Full sample Countries with 10,000
or more students
Engineering Law Engineering Law
Mean 10.39 8.89 12.03 7.25
Median 9.08 5.52 10.25 5.61
25th percentile 3.83 2.65 7.26 3.10
75th percentile 14.31 11.20 15.92 10.05
Table B.III: Regressions of growth of growth-read GDP per capita between
1970 and 1985 on proportions of majors in engineering and law (in 1970)
Model All countries >10,000 Students
(1) (2)
Constant 0.013 0.015
(0.005) (0.004)
Engineering 0.054 0.125
(0.027) (0.037)
Law −0.031 −0.065
(0.025) (0.049)
GDP 1960 0.000 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
N 91 55
R2 0.09 0.23
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Table B.IV: Determinants of growth rate of real GDP per capita between
1970 and 1985
Model All countries >10,000 Students
(1) (2)
Constant 0.018 0.020
(0.010) (0.011)
Investment 0.086 0.085
(0.032) (0.039)
Primary school enrollment 0.022 0.012
(0.009) (0.011)
Government consumption −0.145 −0.064
(0.040) (0.053)
Revolutions and coups −0.028 −0.035
(0.009) (0.009)
GDP 1960 −0.007 −0.006
(0.001) (0.001)
Engineering −0.010 0.054
(0.023) (0.034)
Law −0.024 −0.078
(0.020) (0.040)
N 91 55
R2 0.47 0.56
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Table B.V: Regressions of Table B.II independent variables on proportions
of majors in engineering and law
Model All countries >10,000 Students
(1) (2)
A. Estimated auxiliary regressions for engineering
Investment 0.243 0.432
(0.081) (0.119)
Primary schooling 0.904 1.02
(0.271) (0.408)
Government consumption −0.142 −0.181
(0.056) (0.078)
Revolutions and coups −0.090 −0.300
(0.265) (0.445)
N 91 55
B. Estimated auxiliary regressions for law
Investment −0.093 0.055
(0.076) (0.160)
Primary schooling −0.093 0.576
(0.254) (0.548)
Government consumption 0.006 −0.089
(0.053) (0.105)
Revolutions and coups −0.121 0.141
(0.248) (0.597)
N 91 55
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Table B.VI: Decomposition of the effect of engineering and law majors on
growth into direct and indirect effects
Model All countries >10,000 Students
(1) (2)
A. Estimated effects for engineering
Investment 0.021 0.037
Primary schooling 0.020 0.012
Government consumption 0.021 0.012
Revolutions and coups 0.002 0.003
Direct −0.010 0.054
Total 0.054 0.125
B. Estimated effects for law
Investment −0.008 0.005
Primary schooling −0.002 0.007
Government consumption −0.001 0.006
Revolutions and coups 0.004 −0.005
Direct −0.024 −0.078
Total −0.031 −0.065
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C Histogram
Figure 4: The histogram is based on the 69/87 “Student enrolment > 10,000”
with 1 million drawings.
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